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PerformanceThis paper conducts a cross-country empirical study of the impact of institutions and agency conﬂicts on
ownership reforms and their implications for changes in performance and efﬁciency. We examine two
main questions. First, we evaluate the effects of certain property rights and institutional quality measures
on performance and efﬁciency. We ﬁnd that property rights and contracting rights protections contribute
to stronger post-privatization performance. Second, we ask whether sectors undergoing changes from
state to private ownership exhibit better or worse performance than sectors remaining public. We ﬁnd
an insigniﬁcant effect of privatization in ordinary least squares estimates and a negative short-term effect
after correcting for endogeneity of privatization decisions that disappears in the long run, consistent with
recently privatized enterprises facing short-run costs of restructuring and the challenges of mitigating
agency and expropriation concerns.
 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction property rights on the attributes of the actual privatization. WeIn the eighties and early nineties policy makers and academ-
ics endorsed privatization reforms that have since been con-
ducted in many developed and emerging market countries.
More recently attention has shifted to the varying outcomes of
privatization programs, some of which were implemented with
little to moderate success and enveloped in accusations of nepo-
tism and expropriation of property rights. Separately, law and ﬁ-
nance research has highlighted the role of institutions for capital
market development and ﬁrm performance (for example, La Por-
ta et al. (1998) and subsequent work). In an earlier paper, we
have examined the effects of access to capital on the perfor-
mance of privatized enterprises (see Knyazeva et al., 2009). In
this paper we focus on the performance and efﬁciency implica-
tions of property rights in the context of the outcomes of privati-
zation reforms. Our methodology addresses crucial selection
concerns inherent in the analysis privatization decisions. In addi-
tion, we conduct a telecom industry study to evaluate alternative
dimensions of operating efﬁciency and analyze the effects ofconclude with a discussion of policy implications for the design
of privatization reforms.
First, we examine the determinants of post-privatization perfor-
mance focusing on the role of institutions and accounting for self-
selection into the privatization group. We hypothesize that prop-
erty rights protections are instrumental to post-privatization per-
formance as they both protect recently privatized ﬁrms against
government expropriation and enhance new owners’ incentives
to restructure the ﬁrm and create strong intra-ﬁrm monitoring
mechanisms. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant positive property rights effects
on operating performance. A one standard deviation increase in
the index of property rights protection against expropriation is
associated with up to 1.3% higher average proﬁtability. Although
selection bias is statistically signiﬁcant, the property rights effect
remains qualitatively similar after we account for self-selection
into the privatization reform group.
In addition to the protection of private property rights against
expropriation by the government, the strength of contracting
rights and the effectiveness of the legal system that affects interac-
tion with private counterparties post-privatization are also impor-
tant for post-privatization proﬁtability. For instance, a one-
standard deviation (0.71) decrease in legal formalism (that boosts
contracting rights by easing contract enforcement) has a 1.45 per-
centage point positive effect on proﬁtability.http://
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generally favorable effect, most political institutions measures do
not signiﬁcantly affect post-privatization performance. Proﬁtabil-
ity after privatization is most directly tied to the protection of pri-
vate investors against expropriation and better enforcement of
contractual rights.
Second, we test whether recently privatized sectors outperform
public sectors, controlling for institutions and other characteristics
as well as the endogeneity of privatization. On the one hand, priv-
atizations can improve performance and bring about efﬁciency
gains generated due to removal of ill-incentivized government
administration and introduction of private owners motivated by
value creation. On the other hand, the privatization process im-
poses costs and tradeoffs that may limit proﬁtability in the short
run (direct restructuring costs, the challenges of managing intra-
ﬁrm incentive conﬂicts and the risk of expropriation of the newly
private enterprise by the government, as well as adjusting to the
removal or reduction of government subsidies offered to formerly
state-owned enterprises). Moreover, with inadequate corporate
governance laws, management may ‘‘tunnel’’ the resources of the
ﬁrm for their own purposes. Empirically, we ﬁnd that governments
are more likely to privatize ﬁrms that perform well, biasing tradi-
tional tests of performance effects of privatization. Although the
privatization group performs well on average, after correcting for
endogeneity, we ﬁnd that privatizations exhibit weaker perfor-
mance relative to public sectors in the short run. The ﬁndings high-
light the importance of recognizing endogeneity and the nontrivial
performance challenges facing newly private enterprises in a
framework with agency and expropriation costs. The tradeoff is
most pronounced for enterprises that enjoyed subsidies prior to
privatization. They experience negative effects for up to 10years.
In the long run, the effect becomes insigniﬁcant.
Third, we examine characteristics of privatization transactions.
We ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence of matching of acquirers and privati-
zation targets based on the institutional environment quality. This
suggests that, as with cross-border acquisitions in general, institu-
tional compatibility of buyers and targets is an important consider-
ation in privatization deals; that is, countries with strong property
rights (as reﬂected in our measure) look for and seem attractive to
ﬁrms in countries with strong property rights. In addition, strong
property rights in the privatization target country are associated
with a lower likelihood of diversifying deals (that is, deals in which
the acquiring ﬁrm buys a ﬁrm in a different industry), deals with
foreign buyers, or employee buyouts.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops
hypotheses and testable predictions, discusses existing literature,
and summarizes the contribution of our study. Section 3 discusses
data, variables, and methodological issues due to endogeneity and
selection bias. Section 4 presents the main empirical results and
robustness analyses. Section 5 concludes.1 Good institutional quality also contributes to greater effectiveness of the
privatization process, whereby buyers with the highest valuations become the new
owners, helping maximize efﬁcient allocation of resources in newly private ﬁrms.2. Hypotheses
2.1. Hypotheses and empirical predictions
2.1.1. Property rights in the privatization country and post-
privatization performance
The main question of interest is the role played by the property
rights environment and institutional quality in post-privatization
performance (within theprivatizationsample).Wehypothesize that
the quality of the institutional environment is a signiﬁcant determi-
nant of performance following privatization and we expect better
performance of privatized sectors in the presence of good institu-
tions. Like other privately owned companies, recently privatized
enterprises are now exposed to government rent-seeking, throughPlease cite this article in press as: Knyazeva, A., et al. Ownership change, ins
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankﬁn.2013.02.017direct expropriation of cash ﬂows or assets, the corruption ‘tax’
and related property rights risks (for instance, recently privatized
enterprises are especially vulnerable to a complete asset seizure,
should the privatization be opportunistically reversed). Later, we
will explainwhyourmeasure of ‘‘property rights’’ actually is a proxy
for certain aspects of institutional quality—that get reﬂectednot just
in the performance of private companies subject to expropriation
risk, but also in that of public enterprises. Besides permitting private
owners to invest efﬁciently by limiting government expropriation,
strong property rights protections also encourage them to adopt a
long-termview and establish robustmonitoringmechanisms aimed
at resolving intra-ﬁrm agency conﬂicts. Therefore, the new owners’
incentive to design adequatemonitoringmechanisms, aswell as ﬁre
entrenched insiders and hire and retain better management, is
stronger if overall institutional quality is good.1
Stronger ‘‘institutional quality’’ not only protects against gov-
ernment expropriation, but also against private abuses associated
with inadequate corporate governance (e.g., tunneling). Similarly,
private sector efﬁciency requires the enforcement of contracts.
While there are many details of the institutional and legal regime
that matter, we have data only on overall assessments of certain
attributes of the legal system. We set aside these crucial distinc-
tions, to hypothesize that property rights (or broader measures
of institutional quality) have a positive effect on post-privatization
performance among privatized enterprises.
Further, we ask whether there are spillover effects of property
rights in the buyer country on the performance of the privatized
enterprise. This unanswered question is important for two reasons:
(i) international buyers are often involved in privatization transac-
tions; and (ii) the buyer is likely to become heavily involved in any
restructuring that will occur within the privatized enterprise after
privatization. Additionally, strong property rights in the buyer
country may cause spillovers and become consequential for post-
privatization performance of the privatized enterprise. As a caveat,
institutional quality as reﬂected in our metrics in the country of
the acquirer may affect the organizational performance of the
acquiring company – and thus the performance of the privatized
company; or it may be correlated with other attributes (e.g., the
quality of the education system). Our analysis does not enable us
to distinguish among these alternative hypotheses.2.1.2. Performance in the privatization versus government-owned
groups
We compare performance within the sample of industries in
which there has been a privatization to that of the sample remain-
ing public. A common argument is that privatizations remove
obstacles to proper resource allocation posed by government con-
trol and facilitate the dismissal of poorly motivated government-
appointed managers whose objective function is vastly different
from value maximization. Thus, privatization reforms can jump-
start performance improvements in formerly state-owned enter-
prises (SOEs). By comparison, sectors that remain public continue
to lag behind, exhibiting incrementally worse performance due
to ongoing investment inefﬁciencies and agency costs, resulting
in the empirical prediction that privatized sectors outperform sec-
tors remaining in government ownership. (In our earlier paper, we
provided another reason for improved performance: in cases of
governments facing severe budget constraints, there can be an
underinvestment in publicly owned enterprises, which is corrected
under private ownership.)titutional development and performance. J. Bank Finance (2013), http://
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publicly owned industries in the several years following the own-
ership reform. Importantly, the full beneﬁts of private ownership
do not arise automatically or immediately after privatization. In-
stead, ﬁrms enter a transition period, during which they may post
losses or perform poorly.
Private owners have to deal with the direct costs of restructur-
ing (including any last-minute asset stripping that may have pre-
ceded the privatization deal). In addition, while agency problems
arising from government ownership may be mitigated, private
owners need to address intra-ﬁrm agency conﬂicts due to separa-
tion of (usually, more disperse) ownership and control as well as
manage the new risk of expropriation of the now private ﬁrm by
the government. If the state-owned enterprise used to rely heavily
on subsidies, such subsidies are most likely going to be reduced or
eliminated altogether after privatization as soft budget constraints
are lifted, which may mean a short-term reduction in proﬁtability
that lasts until long-term efﬁciency improvements are realized. In
that case, performance need not improve in the short run. Thus, the
alternative hypothesis is that privatized enterprises do not outper-
form those remaining public and that property rights protections
and contracting institutions are more signiﬁcant in determining
performance than the ownership regime itself.
As an aside, although our focus is on privatized enterprises, we
expect that property rights variables might be signiﬁcant for public
sector performance as well, as a measure of overall quality of pub-
lic governance and effectiveness of government administration.
(Note, to the extent that is true, it implies that our measure reﬂects
far more than property rights, since there is no risk of government
expropriation of government enterprises.)
2.1.3. Privatization deal characteristics
Finally, we will examine the relevance of property rights in the
privatization country for the deal characteristics and the matching
of buyers and privatizing governments. Speciﬁcally, we expect that
privatizations will involve matching of buyers and targets from
compatible legal environments. Short of fully liquidating the priv-
atized enterprise, the buyer is likely to retain substantial asset
exposure to the privatized enterprise’s legal environment. Prospec-
tive buyers (corporations or investors) coming from a low expro-
priation risk environment are less likely to be able to handle
government rent-seeking and effectively mitigate expropriation
risks to the assets of the privatization target. Thus, buyers from
compatible legal environments are more likely to become engaged
in the privatization transaction.
2.1.4. Related work and this paper’s contribution
This paper relates to earlier literature on privatization. Some
studies looked at individual ﬁrms’ or countries’ ownership reforms
and outcomes (see, e.g., La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes, 1997;
Anderson et al., 1997; Noam, 1998; Sun and Tong, 20032). Birdsall
and Nellis (2003) assess distributional effects of privatization. Most
multi-country studies evaluate performance changes in the privati-
zation sample and ﬁnd that performance improves after privatiza-
tion (see, e.g., Boubakri and Cosset, 1998; Megginson et al., 1994;
D’Souza and Megginson, 1999; Bortolotti et al., 2001; Dinc and
Gupta, 2011; Gupta, 2005; Mathur and Banchuenvijit, 2007; for a re-
view, see Villalonga, 2000). Wallsten (2001) ﬁnds positive effects of
establishing a regulator prior to privatization on reform outcomes.
Other studies similarly ﬁnd a positive link between private owner-
ship and performance (see, e.g., Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001;
Boardman and Vining, 1989; Ehrlich et al., 1994; for a review, see,2 Omran (2004) examines newly private Egyptian ﬁrms and ﬁnds that they do not
outperform state-owned enterprises.
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most part, does not address the problem of endogeneity. Notable
exceptions are Gupta et al. (2008), Sabirianova et al. (2012),
Claessens and Djankov (1998) and Dinc and Gupta (2011), which
conﬁrm positive performance effects of privatization in samples
covering Czech Republic, Czech Republic and Russia, seven Central
and Eastern European countries, and India, respectively.
This paper also relates to the broader law and ﬁnance literature
(e.g., La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000; Djankov et al., 2008;
and subsequent work). However, our focus is much more speciﬁc
to the performance of privatizations. There is a large theoretical lit-
erature that argues for the importance of creating good institutions
(including corporate governance laws) prior to privatization and
shows that the failure to do so accounts for the poor record of coun-
tries that engaged in rapid privatizations through shock therapy
(e.g., Stiglitz 2000a, b, 2002; Hoff and Stiglitz, 2008; Ellerman and
Stiglitz, 2000; and the studies cited there). D’Souza et al. (2005)
and Boubakri et al. (2005) ﬁnd that corporate governance and gov-
ernment ownership play an important role in ﬁrm performance.
Godoy and Stiglitz (2007) focus on the relation between privatiza-
tion speed and institutional development. They ﬁnd that the speed
of privatization is negatively associatedwith growth, but legal insti-
tutions have a positive and highly signiﬁcant effect on growth.How-
ever, the paper does not test the effects of varying institutional,
regulatory and other characteristics for the outcomes of privatiza-
tion and focuses instead on privatization speed and design.
We are less directly related to the literature on acquisitions (e.g.,
Erel et al., 2012; Masulis et al., 2007; Kang and Kim, 2008; Kedia
et al., 2008; Moeller et al., 2004). Our research focus is much more
specialized as we look at one subtype of acquisition deals, which
entails government-owned targets.
We contribute to the existing literature by considering overall
privatization performance and key determinants of success of
ownership reforms.
First, we provide new evidence on the differences in perfor-
mance between sectors where privatization has and has not oc-
curred that explicitly accounts for the endogeneity of the
privatization decision. Countries and industries undergoing priv-
atizations are far from being randomly selected. Unobservable
characteristics that are potentially behind future performance
could also be related to the privatization decision. Hence, ordinary
least squares estimates of privatization effects yield spurious evi-
dence. Indeed, we ﬁnd that after accounting for the endogeneity
of privatization decisions, the privatization group underperforms
the group of sectors remaining public, all else equal. This ﬁnding
is opposite to most related evidence and it underscores important
challenges in post-privatization performance and raises questions
about the optimality of privatization decisions.
Second, we document the essential role of institutional, legal,
and regulatory environment factors for the outcome of privatiza-
tion. We account for selection bias and ﬁnd consistent results.
Moreover, we isolate spillover effects of the property rights envi-
ronment in the buyer country on the performance of the sector
undergoing privatization.
Lastly, we ﬁnd that property rights in the privatization country
have signiﬁcant predictive power for buyer selection and design of
privatization transactions.3. Data
3.1. Sample
Our main sample is based on Privatization Barometer (PB) priv-
atizations in ‘Old’ (Western) and ‘New’ (Central and Eastern) Euro-
pean economies. Our ﬁrst set of tests focuses on property rightstitutional development and performance. J. Bank Finance (2013), http://
3 It can be viewed as a supplement to the political stability measure.
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so instances where no deals were reported in a given year are ex-
cluded. Our second set of tests uses the entire sample of Compustat
Global (CG) industries for European countries, including those for
which no privatization transactions were reported. (We recognize
that some ownership changes may not have been recorded or
may have predated the PB data series.) The availability of country
level data on property rights and macroeconomic controls affects
sample size. For robustness, where indicated we use the alternative
sample that extends beyond Europe, based on acquisitions of gov-
ernment-owned companies by non-government buyers reported
in Securities Data Company (SDC) Platinum. Since, unlike PB, it also
provides information on the nation and identity of acquirer (where
disclosed), we also use this sample to analyze the effects of acquir-
er country property rights on privatization outcomes. PB lacks ﬁrm
level IDs for privatized enterprises while SDC provides IDs for only
some privatized enterprises and has missing characteristics data
for most privatization targets. Since we rely on a set of controls
to conduct a more meaningful multivariate examination of perfor-
mance, we aggregate data to the two-digit SIC industry level for
each country and year. We use 1-year leads of proﬁtability, result-
ing in the 1988–2009 period for the main sample, due to CG data
availability (the sample period begins in 1990 with alternative
property rights measures).
Second, we analyze deal level data on privatization design and
buyer selection using SDC data. For this analysis we use property
rights and industry and macro controls, so the sample period is
1985–2010 (begins in 1990 with other expropriation risk mea-
sures). Privatizations are identiﬁed, as with the sector sample,
using government ownership status of the target and non-govern-
ment ownership of the buyer. Acquirer and target nations must be
disclosed and property rights data must be available for both. To
construct the remaining variables of interest, we use information
on buyer and privatization target primary industry, buyer status
as a privately held or publicly listed ﬁrm, and percentage stake
the buyer is seeking to acquire (or own) through the privatization
transaction.
As an additional test, we conduct a sector study of telecom priv-
atizations (e.g., also see Knyazeva et al., 2009). The telecom sector
experienced privatization reforms in a number of developing and
developed economies in the eighties and nineties. Telecoms face
nontrivial expropriation risks due to substantial tangible assets
tied to the country of location and the need for regulatory approv-
als. Further, many telecom privatizations were driven by a need to
raise revenue for ﬁscally constrained governments, especially in
developing economies. While proﬁtability data may be vulnerable
to accounting differences or misreporting, the telecom study uses
operating efﬁciency data from the International Telecommunica-
tions Union (ITU), which is more comparable across economies.
Telecom privatization years are obtained from Wallsten (2002).
However, we also recognize the limitations of small telecom
sample size, which weakens the power of the test, and interpret
the telecom results as suggestive rather than conclusive, with
more deﬁnitive tests of our hypotheses performed on the main
sample.
3.2. Variables
3.2.1. Analysis of performance outcomes across sectors
Following much empirical corporate ﬁnance work, we measure
operating performance by the ratio of operating income before
depreciation to assets, in percentage terms. We use 1-year leads
to mitigate causality concerns (more on causality approach in
Section 3.3).
It is essential to control for other characteristics potentially
associated with performance as well as institutional environmentPlease cite this article in press as: Knyazeva, A., et al. Ownership change, ins
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opportunities, income per capita, and competition in the industry
(using a sales-based Herﬁndahl index). We also control for
differences in the scope of privatization reforms (number of deals,
relative value, and average stake), since more extensive privatiza-
tion programs can generate more signiﬁcant performance
improvements or expropriation risks. Tests using the SDC sample
also incorporate information about property rights in the acquirer
country to examine their ramiﬁcations for post-privatization
performance.3.2.2. Property rights and institutional environment quality
It is important to distinguish property rights protection from
overall institutional environment quality.
The ﬁrst two measures focus on property rights protection from
expropriation. Our ﬁrst measure is the Investment Country Risk
Guide (ICRG) country rating of property rights. Higher values of
the rating, which varies from 0 to 100, reﬂect stronger protection
of property rights against government expropriation. It is a popular
measure of political risk in the law and ﬁnance literature. It is sup-
plemented by data from the World Governance Indicators (WGI)
dataset provided by the World Bank and Kaufmann et al. (2009)
(KKM). We average scores, each of which varies between 2.5
and 2.5, for six dimensions of property rights quality (rule of law,
control over corruption, political stability, voice and accountability,
government effectiveness, and regulatory quality) as well as focus
on individual aspects of the index, namely, control of corruption,
rule of law, and political stability, which are most directly related
to potential for property rights erosion due to government corrup-
tion, political coups, or failure of the courts and law enforcement
authorities to protect property owners.
Some tests also consider French legal origin as a measure of pre-
existing weak institutional quality, following La Porta et al. (1997,
1998). In addition, potential for political conﬂict can cause a back-
lash against large scale privatizations, of which telecoms are a sali-
ent example, increase the risk of their reversal, and depress worker
productivity at privatized ﬁrms. We use ethno-linguistic fraction-
alization to measure potential for conﬂict, following La Porta
et al. (1999).33.2.3. Privatization deal attributes
We consider several important privatization transaction char-
acteristics in the deal level analysis. First, we consider property
rights in the buyer’s country, in the full sample of privatizations
and in the cross-border privatization subsample. Second, we con-
sider indicator variables for buyer type, including buyers that are
privately held (versus publicly listed) and cases where employees
are represented on the buy side. Third, we examine diversifying
privatization deals, since deals involving buyers and targets from
different industries in general have been linked to value destruc-
tion, resulting in a ‘‘diversiﬁcation discount’’ for ﬁrms that oper-
ate in different industries instead of focusing their core
operations in one sector (for more, see, e.g., Amihud and Lev,
1981). Further, we include an indicator for cross-border deals
since greater distance between acquirers and targets has been
linked to worse performance (Kang and Kim, 2008; Kedia et al.,
2008). Finally, we examine the stake being privatized in the spe-
ciﬁc transaction as well as the total percentage stake that the
acquirer is seeking to own in the privatization target after the
deal is completed.
Variable deﬁnitions and descriptive statistics for the main vari-
ables are summarized in Appendix A.titutional development and performance. J. Bank Finance (2013), http://
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We use telecom sector output (main lines) per employee to cap-
ture operating efﬁciency. The use of a real measure of operating
efﬁciency offers several advantages. Unlike proﬁtability, it is not af-
fected by regulatory interventions in price setting mechanisms or
differences in reporting standards before and after privatization
and in privatized versus public subsamples. It also incorporates
the net effect of intra-ﬁrm labor conﬂicts, which may arise in the
privatization setting. To account for the fact that all (privatized
and public) sectors likely saw growth in telephone lines efﬁciency
between the start and the end of the sample period, we compare
changes in average operating efﬁciency in the privatization and
state-owned samples between 1987–1989 and 2000–2002 (we
cannot use privatization year based windows since we require a
comparison public subsample).4
The analysis incorporates several sector-speciﬁc controls: an
indicator for independent telecom regulator presence; an indicator
for local, long-distance, and international telephony competition;
full telecom privatization dummy; and late privatization indicator,
to capture technology and learning effects. Data is based on Li and
Xu (2002) and Wallsten (2002). We use several macro controls,
including population size, initial or current income per capita, ﬁs-
cal balance, credit, inﬂation, and foreign direct investment ﬂows.
To control for pre-existing quality of life effects on worker produc-
tivity, we use life expectancy at birth. Data is obtained from the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). Since the tele-
com sector sample contains African countries, which might follow
a different growth trajectory and have vastly different initial sector
conditions, we include the sub-Saharan Africa dummy control in
this sample. We do not use region or group aggregates, so imputa-
tion of missing macroeconomic observations is not a concern.
However, due to the lower frequency of certain property rights
and political risk indicators, imputed values are used for missing
years. Omitting ﬁlled-in years results in qualitatively similar infer-
ence, albeit within a smaller sample.
3.3. Endogeneity and selection
The analysis of privatization effects on performance can be con-
founded by endogeneity, which is overlooked in most existing
studies of privatization.5 The common observation in existing liter-
ature that privatizations improve performance may be due to non-
random choice of state-owned enterprises to be privatized. For
instance, if governments are seeking to raise revenue fast, as has
been the case for a number of large privatization programs run by
ﬁscally constrained governments (e.g. telecom privatizations in Latin
America), the most lucrative assets, including the best performing
SOEs, may be sold off ﬁrst. Alternatively, a government seeking to
maximize efﬁciency may hold off on privatizing well performing
SOEs because they are already run efﬁciently and a switch to more
disperse private ownership is unlikely to generate improvements.
In either instance, if past performance relates to future performance,
the relationship with privatization will be spurious. A related con-
cern involves selection bias in the analysis within the privatized sub-
sample: selection into the subsample is a function of unobserved
characteristics related to performance. In both cases estimation with
ordinary least squares will bias estimates. We therefore use a selec-
tion model for the analysis of the privatization sample and a treat-4 The growth in cell phone use is not a big concern for most countries during our
sample period (1990–2000). In any case, it should not bias our tests as long as
substitution between cell and land line service is not systematically dependent on
privatization.
5 A recent exception is Dinc and Gupta (2011), which ﬁnds positive performance
effects of privatization in a sample of Indian privatizations, whereas we ﬁnd negative
effects after controlling for endogeneity in a broad cross-country sample.
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Estimates of the determinants of the privatization decision are
shown in Appendix B for the main sample and Appendix D for
the telecom sample (in the latter, the smaller sample size lowers
the signiﬁcance of some estimates). Large enterprises are more
likely to be prioritized for privatization purposes, consistent with
the possibility of raising more revenue. Larger countries, as mea-
sured by population size, seem to be more likely to privatize. Coun-
tries with bigger governments, as measured by the level of
government expenditure in GDP, have more state-owned entities
to divest. Although governments may be more reluctant to privat-
ize labor-intensive industries to avoid large-scale layoffs by new
private owners, the effect is not signiﬁcant. Initial legal origin
and income effects are sensitive to the sample used. In the main
sample, countries with common law legal origin are on the margin
more likely to privatize, but the effect is not signiﬁcant in the tele-
com sample. Within the main European sample, poorer countries
are more likely to privatize as they are the ones catching up on
ownership reforms during our sample period (nineties and
2000s). In the global telecom sample from the late eighties and
nineties, richer countries led emerging markets in the wave of
privatizations.4. Results
4.1. The effects of property rights, contracting environment, and
political institutions on the performance of privatized industries
We begin by examining post-privatization performance as a
function of various dimensions of protection of private property
rights, contracting and legal environment, and political institutions
in the privatizing country. Attribution of the effect of property
rights protection on privatization outcomes to speciﬁc characteris-
tics of the legal and institutional environment is crucial for our
understanding of the role that institutions play in the success of
ownership reforms. We seek to evaluate whether the most signif-
icant effects are due to (i) protection of private property owners
from government expropriation or corruption; (ii) strength of the
judicial system and enforcement of contractual rights between pri-
vate sector counterparties since ﬁrms will transact mainly with
private sector counterparties post-privatization; or (iii) overall
quality of political institutions and accountability of top political
ofﬁcials (less likely, but could be correlated with the property
and contracting rights variables). Answering these questions
would not only help predict privatization successes more clearly
but also potentially provide policy makers with inference on opti-
mal design of legal, contracting and political institutions requisite
for the success of newly private enterprises.
At ﬁrst glance, property rights protection from expropriation,
political accountability, and quality of the legal regime and
enforcement of contractual claims are intertwined. However, re-
cent work by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) and Fernandes and
Kraay (2007), among others, has attempted to differentiate the
institutions that relate to contracting and contract enforcement be-
tween counterparties from those that protect property rights of
private owners from government expropriation or rent seeking
by ofﬁcials. Moreover, in some instances, even when political insti-
tutions and expropriation protections are underdeveloped, an
effective judiciary system can still serve as an enforcer of private6 We also use instrumental variables estimation as an alternative. Both yield
similar inferences. Treatment effects estimation yields more efﬁcient estimates when
the endogenous variable is binary, as is the case for privatization, so we use it for most
of the analysis.
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Table 1
The effects of property rights on the performance of privatized sectors.
I II III IV
Panel A: Private property rights protection
Property rights 0.359***
(0.09)
Control of corruption 2.761***
(0.51)
Rule of law 3.983***
(0.87)
Rule of law and corruption control 3.450***
(0.66)
Size 1.316*** 1.331*** 1.210*** 1.291***
(0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.35)
Growth opportunities 0.088 0.064 0.030 0.056
(1.56) (1.50) (1.52) (1.51)
Economic growth 0.087 0.127 0.085 0.118
(0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
Income per capita 8.895*** 9.265*** 8.968*** 9.303***
(1.06) (1.04) (1.04) (1.05)
Obs. 632 627 627 627
R2 0.267 0.281 0.272 0.279
V VI VII VIII
Property rights 0.297***
(0.09)
Control of corruption 2.111***
(0.55)
Rule of law 2.709***
(0.90)
Rule of law and corruption control 2.560***
(0.70)
Legal formalism 1.788*** 1.324*** 1.500*** 1.356***
(0.41) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43)
Size 1.399*** 1.365*** 1.285*** 1.336***
(0.36) (0.36) (0.37) (0.37)
Growth opportunities 0.162 0.220 0.198 0.211
(1.53) (1.49) (1.52) (1.50)
Economic growth 0.071 0.088 0.048 0.079
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
Income per capita 10.511*** 10.142*** 9.840*** 10.119***
(1.19) (1.15) (1.15) (1.15)
Obs. 628 623 623 623
R2 0.289 0.291 0.285 0.290
I II III IV V VI VII
Panel B: Contracting institutions and legal system
Legal formalism 2.043***
(0.40)
Difﬁculty of enforcing contracts 0.147**
(procedures) (0.06)
Difﬁculty of enforcing contracts 0.004***
(days) (0.0)






Legal system and contract enforcement 0.928***
(0.22)
Size 1.277*** 1.170*** 1.162*** 1.191*** 1.527*** 1.530*** 1.527***
(0.37) (0.36) (0.35) (0.35) (0.39) (0.40) (0.39)
Growth opportunities 0.216 0.003 0.003 0.146 0.197 0.204 0.192
(1.55) (1.62) (1.55) (1.51) (1.69) (1.72) (1.72)
Economic growth 0.047 0.032 0.008 0.090 0.206 0.159 0.207
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.19) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25)
Income per capita 8.659*** 7.222*** 6.814*** 18.079*** 8.870*** 8.786*** 8.729***
(1.10) (1.0) (0.91) (1.83) (1.05) (1.03) (0.99)
Obs. 628 632 632 612 550 550 550
R2 0.278 0.257 0.259 0.315 0.286 0.282 0.286
Panel C. Political system and government effectiveness
Constraint on the executive 0.565
(0.64)
Voice and accountability 0.336
(1.67)
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Size 1.170*** 1.111*** 1.157*** 1.191*** 1.095*** 1.228*** 1.231***
(0.35) (0.35) (0.36) (0.35) (0.35) (0.36) (0.36)
Growth opportunities 0.062 0.068 0.097 0.086 0.072 0.083 0.138
(1.58) (1.58) (1.59) (1.50) (1.58) (1.55) (1.56)
Economic growth 0.051 0.047 0.050 0.113 0.051 0.050 0.067
(0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.22) (0.20) (0.21)
Income per capita 6.330*** 6.293*** 6.453*** 9.005*** 6.177*** 6.918*** 7.203***
(0.90) (0.91) (0.90) (1.04) (1.01) (0.95) (0.94)
Obs. 632 627 632 627 627 632 627
R2 0.251 0.251 0.252 0.276 0.251 0.256 0.258
Sample and variable deﬁnitions are presented in Appendix A. Property rights effects on the performance of privatized industries in the sample of European privatizations. The
dependent variable is proﬁtability (1-year lead). Privatization indicator equals one if one or more deals was reported in the sector in a given period. Two-digit industry effects
are included. Robust standard errors are in the parentheses.
⁄ Statistical signiﬁcance at 10% level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at 1% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at 5% level.
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provide enough of an incentive for newly private companies to en-
gage in positive-NPV investment projects and pursuit of growth
opportunities. On the other hand, property rights protection from
government expropriation could be especially important after
privatization since the state is no longer the only claim holder on
the ﬁrm and private investors are vulnerable to potential rent seek-
ing by the state.
Empirical evidence is presented in Table 1. We draw on earlier
work in classifying various country level characteristics into mea-
sures of property rights protection, contracting environment, and
political institutions.
4.1.1. Protection of property rights from expropriation
Our main measure of protection of property rights from expro-
priation is based on the ICRG index of protection against expropri-
ation by the government, also used in La Porta et al. (1998) and
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), among others. Further, since cor-
ruption results in the erosion of the private company’s value and
cash ﬂows due to rent seeking by government ofﬁcials, similarly
to Fernandes and Kraay (2007), we use control over corruption as
a second measure of property rights protection from expropriation.
Finally, since an environment with limited rule of law enables
unfettered expropriation of private businesses with no recourse
for the shareowners, we supplement the control of corruption in-
dex with the rule of law index from KKM.
In Panel A, various measures of private property rights protec-
tion against government expropriation enter with strongly signiﬁ-
cant coefﬁcients. The economic importance of the coefﬁcients is
commonly assessed by examining the effect of a one-standard
deviation change in the explanatory variable on the dependent var-
iable. Holding other factors constant, a one-standard deviation in-
crease (3.6 points on a 0–100 scale) in the ICRG property rights
index is associated with a 1.3% increase in average proﬁtability.
Ceteris paribus, increases by one standard deviation in the corrup-
tion control score (0.62 points on a 2.5 to 2.5 scale) and in the
rule of law score (0.37 points on a 2.5 to 2.5 scale) are associated
with increases in proﬁtability by 1.7% and 1.5%, respectively.7 Gi-7 Since the ICRG and KKM variables are alternative sources of data on the
expropriation risk to private property rights, they are included one by one.
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those effects are economically meaningful.
In terms of other controls, large ﬁrms have a performance
advantage following privatization. Large ﬁrms beneﬁt from the
economies of scale. Further, consistent with the argument that
privatized companies need to procure their own ﬁnancing through
capital markets (Knyazeva et al., 2009), ﬁrms characterized by few-
er information asymmetries are likely to face fewer ﬁnancing con-
straints post-privatization and be more proﬁtable. Growth
opportunities enter with insigniﬁcant coefﬁcients. Developing
economies are associated with higher proﬁtability, consistent with
the potential of greater proﬁt generation opportunities as countries
catch up to developed markets.4.1.2. Contracting and legal environment
Panel A has focused on the protection of private investors from
government expropriation. However, it is possible that the mea-
sure is simply capturing the quality of the contracting environ-
ment. In earlier work, the quality of contracting institutions has
been captured by legal formalism (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005;
Fernandes and Kraay, 2007), deﬁned as the number of legal proce-
dures for collecting on debts or bounced checks or enforcing a con-
tract. A higher number of required legal procedures to enforce
contracts suggests more complicated and less investor-friendly le-
gal contracting institutions. The data on the index of formality in
legal procedures for collecting on a bounced check is obtained from
Djankov et al. (2003) and the data on the number of procedures it
takes to enforce a contract is obtained from the Doing Business
dataset of the World Bank (since the data starts in 2003 or 2004
for most countries, years prior to the start of reporting use the ear-
liest available value). In addition, we draw on the Gwartney et al.
(2011) Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) data on the inde-
pendence of courts and effectiveness of the legal system and con-
tract enforcement as well as the La Porta et al. (1998) data on the
effectiveness of the judicial system.
The results are presented in Panel B. Contracting environment is
very important after privatization. In terms of economic magni-
tude, for instance, a one-standard deviation (0.71) decrease in legal
formalism (that boosts contracting rights by easing contract
enforcement) has a 1.45% positive effect on proﬁtability. A de-
crease in the number of procedures required to enforce a contracttitutional development and performance. J. Bank Finance (2013), http://
Table 2
Property rights effects on the performance of privatized sectors: correcting for selection bias.
I II III IV
Panel A: Private property rights protection
Property rights 0.222**
(0.09) (0.09)
Control of corruption 2.139***
(0.51)
Rule of law 2.669***
(0.84)
Rule of law and corruption control 2.568***
(0.65)
Size 2.006*** 2.023*** 1.954*** 1.993***
(0.35) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36)
Growth opportunities 0.201 0.259 0.250 0.255
(1.27) (1.28) (1.27) (1.28)
Economic growth 0.108 0.144 0.102 0.133
(0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19)
Income per capita 9.380*** 9.930*** 9.489*** 9.880***
(1.02) (1.03) (1.02) (1.03)
Obs. 8834 8829 8829 8829
Wald test of independence of equations (Ho: independent) 26.50*** 23.24 v 23.79*** 22.82***
V VI VII VIII
Property rights 0.174**
Control of corruption 1.451***
(0.52)
Rule of law 1.399*
(0.84)
Rule of law and corruption control 1.633**
(0.66)
Legal formalism 1.689*** 1.406*** 1.585*** 1.452***
(0.41) (0.42) (0.42) (0.42)
Size 2.087*** 2.107*** 2.080*** 2.092***
(0.37) (0.38) (0.38) (0.38)
Growth opportunities 0.383 0.408 0.420 0.409
(1.28) (1.28) (1.27) (1.28)
Economic growth 0.088 0.100 0.060 0.089
(0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Income per capita 10.562*** 10.524*** 10.128*** 10.439***
(1.06) (1.07) (1.06) (1.07)
Obs. 8830 8825 8825 8825
Wald test of independence of equations (Ho: independent) 23.67*** 22.67*** 24.76*** 22.99***
I II III IV V VI VII
Panel B: Contracting institutions and legal system
Legal formalism 1.819***
(0.41)
Difﬁculty of enforcing contracts (procedures) 0.153***
(0.06)
Difﬁculty of enforcing contracts (days) 0.004***
(0.0)






Legal system and contract enforcement 0.608***
(0.22)
Size 2.069*** 1.993*** 1.986*** 1.786*** 2.466*** 2.470*** 2.455***
(0.37) (0.35) (0.34) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39)
Growth opportunities 0.446 0.341 0.323 0.019 0.472 0.480 0.469
(1.26) (1.25) (1.21) (1.34) (1.33) (1.35) (1.35)
Economic growth 0.023 0.049 0.081 0.121 0.263 0.216 0.245
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21)
Income per capita 9.523*** 8.828*** 8.451*** 15.994*** 10.324*** 10.110*** 10.035***
(1.01) (1.01) (0.95) (1.82) (1.06) (1.03) (1.0)
Obs. 8830 8834 8834 8814 8752 8752 8752
Wald test of independence of equations (Ho: independent) 29.34*** 34.25*** 34.69*** 10.80*** 39.54*** 39.17 37.67***
Panel C. Political system and government effectiveness
Constraint on the executive 0.606
(0.69)
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Size 1.971*** 1.976*** 1.994*** 1.930*** 1.992*** 2.092*** 1.992***
(0.35) (0.35) (0.35) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36)
Growth opportunities 0.293 0.293 0.323 0.146 0.265 0.437 0.261
(1.24) (1.24) (1.22) (1.28) (1.25) (1.20) (1.25)
Economic growth 0.017 0.013 0.015 0.132 0.029 0.038 0.031
(0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18)
Income per capita 7.981*** 7.366*** 7.910*** 9.658*** 7.946*** 8.706*** 7.963***
(0.96) (0.96) (0.95) (1.01) (1.08) (1.03) (0.93)
Obs. 8834 8829 8834 8829 8829 8834 8829
Wald test of independence of equations (Ho: independent) 33.13*** 36.77*** 37.28*** 23.87*** 32.74*** 34.51*** 27.89***
Sample and variable deﬁnitions are presented in Appendix A. Property rights effects on the performance of privatized industries in the sample of European privatizations. The
dependent variable is proﬁtability (1-year lead). Privatization indicator equals one if one or more deals was reported in the sector in a given period. Maximum-likelihood
selection model is estimated using determinants of privatization choice from Appendix B, column 1. Two-digit industry effects are included. Robust standard errors are in the
parentheses.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at 1% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at 5% level.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at 10% level.
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fect on proﬁtability, all else equal.
Moreover, the strength of contracting institutions has addi-
tional importance for predicting post-privatization performance
when introduced into the speciﬁcations examining private prop-
erty rights protection from expropriation in Panel A. Indeed, while
private investors must be concerned about government rent seek-
ing with respect to enterprises that are no longer under (full) gov-
ernment control, since they now also have to interact with private
counterparties on contractual claims, the quality of the contracting
and legal institutions is also important.4.1.3. General quality of political institutions and constraint on the
executive
Finally, in Panel C we turn our attention to supplementary mea-
sures that might be less related to expropriation but rather capture
the overall risk of political instability and the quality of political
institutions and democracy in the country. We use KKM political
stability, government effectiveness, voice and accountability, and
broad regulatory quality scores, and following Acemoglu and John-
son (2005), the Polity IV index of the extent of constraints on the
executive. Although political stability and government effective-
ness have a generally favorable effect, most political institutions
measures do not come in signiﬁcantly. Speciﬁcity of the beneﬁts
to the proﬁtability after privatization from greater protection of
private investors against expropriation and better enforcement of
contractual rights is far more consistent with our main hypothesis
than the general effects of political institutions.4.1.4. Accounting for the non-random selection into the privatization
group
Given the conceptual importance of selection concerns, we re-
peat the estimation of property rights effects on post-privatization
performance using a selection model, which was described in Sec-
tion 3. Estimates are summarized in Table 2. TheWald test strongly
rejects the null hypothesis of independence of selection and prof-Please cite this article in press as: Knyazeva, A., et al. Ownership change, ins
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankﬁn.2013.02.017itability equations, conﬁrming our intuition about the need to ac-
count for non-random selection into the privatization sample.
However, encouragingly, we observe that the main property
rights result is corroborated after correction for selection. The ef-
fects remain statistically and economically signiﬁcant for all mea-
sures of private property rights protection against expropriation as
well as all measures of contracting rights and legal environment.
The general quality of political institutions, limited government
and democracy does not appear to be relevant for post-privatiza-
tion performance (the government effectiveness score retains its
signiﬁcance).
Other controls enter with consistent coefﬁcients. Some property
rights coefﬁcients enter with lower magnitudes, possibly due to
the fact that better pre-privatization performance, intuitively asso-
ciated with strong property rights, predicts selection into the priv-
atization according to the ﬁrst stage model estimates in Appendix
B. However, though selection bias is present and it is important to
address it, the general direction of the property rights and con-
tracting rights effects is preserved, providing support for our main
hypothesis.4.1.5. Robustness tests
We have already considered additional controls, as well as
industry effects, and several different property rights measures in
Tables 1 and 2. Further robustness checks are shown in Appendix
C. Models with correction for selection used fewer observations
for the treatment (privatization) sample than ordinary least
squares due to missing observations on privatization determinants.
To ensure that differences in sample coverage are not skewing our
interpretation of the results, we repeat ordinary least squares esti-
mates of the main speciﬁcation, contained in Column I of Table 1,
after excluding observations with missing determinants data. The
results are similar (Column I). Since ﬁnancial ﬁrms are likely to
be subject to different regulatory treatment and have different
debt usage patterns, they are often excluded in empirical corporate
ﬁnance analysis. Exclusion of ﬁnancials does not qualitatively
change the results (Column II). The control for the proportion oftitutional development and performance. J. Bank Finance (2013), http://
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in Column III, does not enter signiﬁcantly, and it does not affect the
signiﬁcance of the property rights coefﬁcients. For robustness we
also reproduce the main test in the SDC sample, which includes
non-European as well as European privatizations, in Column IV,
and arrive at similar estimates. Thus, based on the evidence pre-
sented above, property rights are essential for realizing strong
post-privatization operating performance. The effect continues to
hold across multiple property rights metrics and after accounting
for selection bias.
4.1.6. Acquirer effects on the performance of privatized industries
Next, we ask whether property rights in the buyer’s country
have incremental signiﬁcance for post-privatization performance
of the industry undergoing the privatization reform. To the extent
that the buyer is expected to actively partake in restructuring the
privatized enterprise, and buyer’s incentives to restructure and
set up improved monitoring mechanisms within the privatized
enterprise are affected by the buyer’s own property rights environ-
ment, then we can observe signiﬁcant spillovers of buyer property
rights protection on privatization outcomes. The empirical evi-
dence is presented in Table 3.
In Columns I–III, the quality of overall acquirer property rights,
as well as individual dimensions of private property rights protec-
tion from expropriation in the buyer’s country, such as control of
corruption and rule of law, have a positive effect on post-privatiza-
tion performance in the privatization sample, consistent with the
latter conjecture. The effect of interest remains signiﬁcant when
additional controls are introduced in Columns IV–VII. Further, the
effect continues to hold when we restrict our attention to the sub-
sample of cross-border deals only (Columns VI–VII) or correct for
selection bias (Column VIII). Control coefﬁcients are not surprising.
Larger ﬁrms continue to perform better. The biggest proﬁt oppor-
tunities are found in developing countries. Less competitive indus-
tries are associated with wider proﬁt margins. Cross-borderTable 3
Acquirer property rights effects on the performance in privatized sectors.
I II III
Acquirer property rights quality 1.444***
(.51)
Acquirer control of corruption 1.074***
(.38)
Acquirer rule of law 1.278***
(.46)
Size 1.622*** 1.601*** 1.616***
(.29) (.28) (.29)







Income per capita 2.282*** 2.227*** 2.230***
(.38) (.36) (.37)
Obs. 704 704 704
R2 0.27 0.27 0.27
Sample and variable deﬁnitions are presented in Appendix A. Regressions of acquirer prop
indicator equals one if one or more deals was reported in the sector in a given period. Th
squares. Columns VI–VII use crossborder privatization deals only. Column VIII uses a m
choice from Appendix B, column 1. Two-digit industry effects are included. Robust stan
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at 1% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at 5% level.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at 10% level.
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distance. Proxies for how extensive privatization reforms are,
based on logged number and relative value of privatization deals,
are inconclusive, as is the diversiﬁcation indicator coefﬁcient. Thus,
the property rights environment in the buyer’s country appears to
be important for assuring operating performance improvement in
the privatizing sector following privatization, consistent with our
prediction.
4.2. Privatization and property rights effects on performance
We have so far focused on the effects of property rights and le-
gal and political environment characteristics on the performance in
the privatization group. Tests of the privatization and institutional
environment effects on proﬁtability in the full sample, which in-
cludes both cases of privatizations and government ownership,
are shown in Table 4. Panel A uses the ICRG measure of property
rights. The effect of property rights, shown in Tables 1 and 2 to
be meaningful for post-privatization performance, remains signiﬁ-
cant in the full sample of sectors. All else equal, a one-standard
deviation increase in the ICRG index is associated with a 0.8–
0.9% increase in proﬁtability.
Larger ﬁrms are associated with better performance. The most
lucrative proﬁt generation opportunities are present in emerging
economies, even within the European sample, as conﬁrmed by
the negative effect of GDP per capita, our macro level proxy for
the level of economic development. Additional controls are con-
tained in Columns II–III. Industries with less competition are on
average more proﬁtable, consistent with the intuition about
monopolies versus perfectly competitivemarkets. It is an important
reminder that ‘‘success’’ in terms of private proﬁtability does not
necessarily correspond to an increase in social welfare: the in-
creased proﬁtability of a privatized monopoly may only be a conse-
quence of its greater willingness to exploit consumers, not because
of enhanced efﬁciency. After controlling for other determinants,IV V VI VII VIII
1.886*** 1.900*** 1.573** 1.541** 2.393***
(.56) (.55) (.77) (.76) (.85)
1.589*** 1.590*** 1.745*** 1.605*** 2.944***
(.28) (.28) (.46) (.46) (.44)
0.309 0.384 0.279 0.536 0.241
(.49) (.48) (.92) (.90) (.62)
1.717** 1.931** 2.383 4.953***









2.523*** 2.666*** 2.578*** 2.727*** 3.440***
(.41) (.42) (.54) (.58) (.72)
704 704 314 314 17,859
0.28 0.30 0.33 0.36
erty rights effects on privatized sector performance in the SDC sample. Privatization
e dependent variable is proﬁtability (1-year lead). Columns I–VII use ordinary least
aximum-likelihood selection model estimated with determinants of privatization
dard errors are in the parentheses.
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Table 4
Privatization and property rights effects on performance (all sectors).
I II III
Panel A: Main tests
Privatization 0.214 1.206 0.917
(.29) (.87) (.86)
Property rights 0.236*** 0.236*** 0.206***
(.03) (.03) (.03)
Size 1.116*** 1.118*** 1.148***
(.09) (.09) (.09)
Growth opportunities 0.367 0.371 0.324
(.24) (.24) (.24)
Privatization deals 0.517 0.365
(.39) (.39)






Income per capita 4.375*** 4.387*** 4.008***
(.26) (.26) (.27)
Obs. 10,746 10,746 10,746
R2 0.16 0.16 0.16
I II III IV
Panel B: Other property rights risk measures
Privatization 0.167 0.065 0.126 0.181
(.29) (.29) (.29) (.29)
Property rights quality 3.698***
(.28)
Control of corruption 1.937***
(.15)




Size 1.118*** 1.076*** 1.081*** 1.152***
(.09) (.09) (.09) (.09)
Growth opportunities 0.390 0.410* 0.413* 0.319
(.24) (.24) (.24) (.24)
Income per capita 5.020*** 4.811*** 4.864*** 3.751***
(.25) (.25) (.25) (.22)
Obs. 10,718 10,718 10,718 10,718
R2 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
Sample and variable deﬁnitions are presented in Appendix A. Regressions of priv-
atization and property rights effects on performance in the European sample of all
(privatized and public) sectors. The dependent variable is proﬁtability (1-year lead).
Privatization indicator equals one if one or more deals was reported in the sector in
a given period. Two-digit industry effects are included. Robust standard errors are
in the parentheses.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at 1% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at 5% level.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at 10% level.
Table 5
Privatization and property rights effects on performance (all sectors): accounting for
the choice of privatization.
I II III IV
Privatization 12.332*** 12.357*** 20.126*** 27.482***
(.55) (.56) (3.88) (4.11)






Size 1.299*** 1.301*** 1.302*** 1.382***
(.10) (.10) (.11) (.11)
Growth opportunities 0.557* 0.567** 0.268 0.160
(.29) (.29) (.36) (.39)
Income per capita 7.110*** 7.168*** 9.206*** 10.322***
(.42) (.42) (.61) (.71)
Obs. 8660 8625 8660 8625
Sample and variable deﬁnitions are presented in Appendix A. Regressions of priv-
atization and property rights effects on performance in the European sample of all
(privatized and public) sectors. The dependent variable is proﬁtability (1-year lead).
Columns I and II use treatment effects estimation. Columns III and IV use instru-
mental variables estimation. Privatization indicator equals one if one or more deals
were reported in the sector in a given period. Two-digit industry effects are
included. Privatization is predicted with the ﬁrst-stage determinants in Table C1.
Robust standard errors are in the parentheses.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at 1% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at 5% level.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at 10% level.
8 The effects of increased expropriation risks and of reduced subsidization by the
government of newly privatized ﬁrms that are no longer under state ownership
combined have the effect of limiting post-privatization proﬁtability in the short term.
We evaluate this hypothesis as well as the horizon of the privatization effect on
proﬁtability in more detail in Table 6.
9 In untabulated tests, we ﬁnd that strong protections from expropriation and
corruption, greater government effectiveness and a higher level of political stability
are also associated with better performance of public sectors. Intuitively, deadweight
costs of asset stripping and government rent-seeking are likely to be lower when
corruption is better controlled and governments are more effective. As a result,
performance should be better even under state ownership. The positive effects of
property rights in the both privatization and public groups combine to yield a positive
overall effect of property rights on performance.
A. Knyazeva et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance xxx (2013) xxx–xxx 11growth opportunities do not enter signiﬁcantly. Privatization scale
controls yield ambiguous evidence – deal count and average stake
are not signiﬁcant, while privatization deal value relative to indus-
try assets has a positive sign.
Panel B replicates the main test using other measures of prop-
erty rights quality. The overall index of property rights quality
based on KKM has a signiﬁcant positive relation to operating per-
formance. An increase by 1 in the property rights quality index,
which varies between 2.5 and 2.5, is associated with a 3.7% in-
crease in average proﬁtability in the sector, all else equal (Column
I). Individual property rights determinants have signiﬁcant positive
effects in Columns II–IV. Their economic effects are also meaning-
ful and range from 1% to 1.3% for a one-standard deviation increase
in the KKM measure.
In the OLS speciﬁcation, the effect of privatization itself is not
signiﬁcant.Please cite this article in press as: Knyazeva, A., et al. Ownership change, ins
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankﬁn.2013.02.017We account for the choice of privatization in Table 5 using the
model of privatization determinants from Appendix B. The privati-
zation coefﬁcient estimate changes from statistically insigniﬁcant
to negative and signiﬁcant. The effect is economically important
and represents a reversal from ordinary least squares results. Con-
sistent with the ﬁnding in Appendix B, governments in the sample
on average privatize better performing sectors. Correcting for this
non-causal positive effect should lead to a decrease in the privati-
zation coefﬁcient estimate, and we note it becomes negative. This
result does not suggest that private ownership is inherently inefﬁ-
cient or value destroying or that privatized sectors post losses. (As
can be seen from the summary statistics in Appendix A, the aver-
age proﬁtability in the privatization group was signiﬁcantly posi-
tive (above 10% of assets on average).) This test merely provides
a multivariate comparison of privatization and non-privatization
groups and suggests that the privatization process may pose trade-
offs that have the effect of lowering proﬁtability in relative terms,
compared to other enterprises, at least over a short horizon. Intu-
itively, it takes time for the newly private ﬁrm to recoup direct
costs of restructuring and to respond to decreases or elimination
of subsidies previously directed to the ﬁrm under state ownership
as well as new intra-ﬁrm conﬂicts and/or government expropria-
tion risks.8
The property rights environment retains its signiﬁcance as a
determinant of performance.9titutional development and performance. J. Bank Finance (2013), http://
12 A. Knyazeva et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance xxx (2013) xxx–xxxSeveral additional robustness tests are presented in Appendix C.
Observations with missing data on privatization determinants are
excluded in Column I, to assure sample consistency between ordin-
ary least squares and endogeneity correction tests and to avoid
attributing differences in privatization effect estimates to different
sample coverage. Financial sector observations are excluded in Col-
umn II and additional controls are considered in Column III. Consis-
tent with the industrial organization literature, proﬁtability tends
to be higher in more concentrated industries. Privatizations involv-
ing larger average stakes and public offers as opposed to privately
negotiated sales perform marginally better. Use of the SDC sample,
which includes countries outside Europe, in place of the Privatiza-
tion Barometer sample, in Columns IV–V yields ﬁndings that are
highly similar to the analysis of the main sample in Tables 3 and
4. In untabulated tests, repeating the analysis using proﬁtability
changes yields similar results.
An important question in the context of our argument is the ex-
tent of persistence of the privatization effects. Indeed, it is impor-
tant to know if the downside from privatization tradeoffs is
eventually eliminated and how soon that occurs for a typical priv-
atization reform. We examine this question in Table 6.Table 6







t + 1 7.974*** 8.105***
(1.59) (1.88)
t + 2 7.531*** 7.298***
(1.24) (2.28)
t + 3 8.266*** 7.132***
(1.51) (2.16)
t + 4 8.605*** 6.875***
(1.50) (2.23)
t + 5 9.096*** 6.242***
(1.43) (2.06)
t + 6 8.995*** 5.652***
(1.66) (2.03)
t + 7 7.940*** 4.588**
(1.03) (1.87)
t + 8 7.565*** 3.835**
(1.23) (1.81)
t + 9 7.857*** 2.180
(1.24) (1.64)
t + 10 7.475*** 2.326
(1.79) (1.44)
t + 11 5.394 1.089
(3.71) (1.60)
t + 12 4.170 2.580**
(3.90) (1.23)
t + 13 2.879 3.500***
(4.08) (1.36)
t + 14 1.045 4.554**
(1.67) (1.90)
t + 15 0.802 0.214
(1.39) (2.62)
Sample and variable deﬁnitions are presented in Appendix A. Regressions of priv-
atization and property rights effects on performance in the European sample of all
(privatized and public) sectors. The dependent variable is proﬁtability (in years t + 1
through t + 15). Treatment effects estimation. Privatization indicator equals one in
year after the conclusion of privatization. Two-digit industry effects are included.
Privatization is predicted with the ﬁrst-stage determinants in Appendix B, columns
1, and the pre-privatization index of SOE presence in the economy from Gwartney
et al. (2011). Control for proﬁtability in the year preceding the start of privatization
is added; its omission does not affect the result. The data on subsidies is obtained
from EFW. The sample for this test excludes countries in the top quartile of private
ownership prior to privatization based on La Porta et al. (2002) measure of SOEs in
the economy. Robust standard errors are in the parentheses.
 Statistical signiﬁcance at 10% level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at 1% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at 5% level.
Please cite this article in press as: Knyazeva, A., et al. Ownership change, ins
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankﬁn.2013.02.017Privatization is traditionally associated with the elimination of
soft budget constraints across the board. In some cases heavy gov-
ernment subsidization of state-owned enterprises could have
aided their proﬁtability, whereas they would have to improve efﬁ-
ciency, which takes time, to sustain such performance indepen-
dently. Therefore, we condition the test on variation in the
extent of subsidization prior to privatization. In cases of greater
pre-privatization reliance on the government for subsidies and
transfers prior to privatization, the short- and medium-run effects
of privatization are negative, consistent with the newly private
enterprises struggling to achieve proﬁtability after subsidies are
removed. However, the effect is mitigated in the long run as the
necessary efﬁciency improvements are implemented.
Thus, consistent with what one might expect, privatization ef-
fects grow weaker and become insigniﬁcant in the long run
(10 years since the reform completion), corroborating the notion
that the tradeoffs are felt more acutely in the short to medium
term. With the passage of time, companies are able to leverage
the incentive improvements associated with the switch to private
ownership and compensate for the costs of restructuring.
By comparison, in cases where the government did not subsi-
dize heavily prior to privatization, newly privatized ﬁrms do not
experience the adverse shock of subsidy reduction and instead ap-
pear to beneﬁt right away from a switch to private ownership
through privatization.
The results of Tables 3–6 yield several conclusions. The tradi-
tional evidence on the effects of privatization is likely confounded
by the non-random nature of privatization decisions, with better
performers more likely to be privatized, all else equal. Accounting
for the choice of privatization in an attempt to identify a causal
relation between privatization and performance lowers the ob-
served privatization estimate and renders it negative, supporting
the need to recognize the short-term costs of privatization that
weigh on proﬁtability as well as its long-term beneﬁts from
improvement in incentives. The challenges to sustaining proﬁtabil-
ity for newly privatized enterprises are most pronounced when
there is heavy reliance on government subsidies prior to privatiza-
tion (lowered post-privatization). Although the effect is strong in
the short run, it disappears in the long run (or at least becomes sta-
tistically insigniﬁcant, though the coefﬁcient remains negative).
While this evidence updates conventional wisdom about privatiza-
tion, it is important to note its context and timing and recognize
that it represents a relative comparison with the non-privatization
group and that average proﬁtability remains positive in the privati-
zation group.
4.2.1. Telecom study
Appendix D (Panel B) reports univariate tests of differences in
operating efﬁciency for privatized and state-owned subsamples.
Without controlling for other determinants, operating efﬁciency
levels have improved over time in both privatization and govern-
ment-owned samples, by 93.7 and 53.4 lines per employee, respec-
tively, with the privatization sample posting a better overall
improvement in levels of output per employee. When we look at
rates of change in operating efﬁciency, while both samples exhibit
increases in the rate of change in efﬁciency, they are not signiﬁ-
cantly different from zero, nor is the difference due to privatization
statistically signiﬁcant. Thus, univariate evidence is not conclusive.
Table 7, Panel A reports the effects of various determinants of
performance changes around telecom privatizations after correct-
ing for selection into the privatization subsample.10 Tests within
the telecom privatization sample corroborate the property rights
ﬁnding obtained in the main sample. Good institutional quality con-10 Test statistics, corroborate our concern about selection bias.




Panel A: Property rights effects on performance of privatized sectors
Property rights 0.336*** 0.388** 0.396**
(.12) (.16) (.16)
French legal origin 1.249
(2.87)
Regulator (prior) 4.508** 4.342** 4.394**
(2.18) (2.14) (2.14)
Domestic bank credit 0.053 0.050 0.050
(.05) (.05) (.06)
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization 19.810** 18.615** 17.699**
(8.00) (8.50) (8.37)
Life expectancy 0.470 0.396 0.359
(.38) (.40) (.39)
GNP per capita (logged) 8.526*** 8.485*** 8.415***
(2.03) (2.02) (2.04)
Main lines (prior) 0.007 0.007
(.01) (.02)
Sub-Saharan Africa 15.914*** 15.759*** 15.602***
(4.52) (4.51) (4.58)
Obs. 62 62 62
I II
Panel B. Privatization effects on performance
Privatization 13.080*** 13.093***
(4.04) (4.04)
Property rights 0.051 0.079
(.18) (.22)
Budget balance 0.684* 0.682*
(.36) (.36)
Regulatory reform 6.291 6.302
(4.50) (4.50)
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization 14.722* 14.641*
(8.24) (8.25)
Life expectancy 0.859** 0.880**
(.37) (.38)
Sub-Saharan Africa 10.591** 10.577**
(4.36) (4.35)
GDP per capita (logged) 0.017 0.036
(1.06) (1.07)
Population (logged) 1.276 1.128
(2.44) (2.54)
Main lines (prior) 0.004
(.02)
Obs. 55 55
Panel A: Performance gains in privatized sectors: Heckman selection model. The
dependent variable is the change in the average growth of main lines per employee
from 1987–1989 to 2000–2002. Variables included in the ﬁrst stage model: legal
origin, property rights, CPI, primary school enrollment, population size, GDP per
capita (initial), main lines per capita (initial).
Panel B: Changes in performance in public and privatized sectors: two-step treat-
ment effects model. The dependent variable in the change in the average growth of
main lines per employee from 1987–1989 to 2000–2002. Determinants of the
privatization decision: legal origin, property rights, CPI, primary school enrollment,
population size, GNP per capita (initial), main lines per capita (initial).
Sample and variable deﬁnitions are presented in Appendix A. Robust standard
errors are in the parentheses.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at 1% level.
** Statistical signiﬁcance at 5% level.
* Statistical signiﬁcance at 10% level.
11 Property rights protection is plausibly more important for privatized telecoms
than for the full sample, which also contains state-controlled sectors. Where
government expropriation of private owners is naturally less material.
A. Knyazeva et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance xxx (2013) xxx–xxx 13tributes to stronger operating efﬁciency improvements in privatized
telecom sectors. Weak property rights protection erodes perfor-
mance growth.
Other coefﬁcients appear intuitive. Establishment of an inde-
pendent regulator plays a favorable role in post-privatization per-
formance improvements, and this effect is not overridden by legal
or political institutions. An independent regulatory agency may
help resolve some of the intra-ﬁrm incentive conﬂicts under pri-
vate ownership, and an independent regulator may be less likely
to engage in expropriation under the guise of oversight. Potential
for conﬂict due to high ethno-linguistic fractionalization has a neg-Please cite this article in press as: Knyazeva, A., et al. Ownership change, ins
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankﬁn.2013.02.017ative effect. To meaningfully interpret conﬂict effects, we need to
control for regional differences, such as the Sub-Saharan Africa
countries characterized by political conﬂict and weak growth. In-
deed, African countries experience worse performance, but the
other variables of interest remain signiﬁcant. All else equal, richer
countries see fewer improvements post-privatization, possibly,
since they are closer to the optimal level of operating performance
whereas poorer countries start out at a lower level and improve at
a faster rate as they bridge the gap.
Next we consider the overall effect of privatization alongside
institutional quality effects. Are (recently) privatized telecom sec-
tors posting stronger performance improvements than sectors
remaining in government ownership? The results are shown in Pa-
nel B of Table 7. Privatized sectors perform signiﬁcantly worse,
consistent with our earlier ﬁnding for the main sample. Institu-
tional quality results are mixed.11 While regulatory reforms matter
in the aftermath of ownership changes, they do not lead to perfor-
mance improvements in the sample of privatized and public sectors.
Robustness checks are shown in Appendix D. In the tests of
post-privatization performance in Panel C, we add an indicator
for full versus partial privatization, which does not enter signiﬁ-
cantly. Following Li and Xu (2002), who ﬁnd signiﬁcant effects of
competition, we include competition proxies. More competitive
market conditions spur improvements in operating efﬁciency.
(This is in contrast to the tests of proﬁtability, where increases in
concentration lead to improved performance.) Property rights ef-
fects remain signiﬁcant. FDI ﬂows are positively related to efﬁ-
ciency, although we exercise caution in interpretation since the
effect may not be causal in nature. (Again, this is in a sense in con-
trast to the broader study, where cross-border privatizations per-
formed more poorly.) Panel D performs robustness checks on the
full sample of privatized and government-owned telecom sectors.
Inclusion of partial privatizations in the sample may underesti-
mate the positive effects of privatization to performance. We do
not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant effect of full privatizations. Countries with
earlier privatizations might have had more years to realize the full
beneﬁts of private ownership. Alternatively, global learning and
technological advances would explain better performance of priv-
atizations later in the decade. The early reform effect is not
signiﬁcant.4.2.2. Property rights, acquirer-target matching, and privatization deal
characteristics
We now turn to the analysis of privatization transaction attri-
butes in the context of the privatizing country’s property rights
environment. Table 8 reports estimates of regressions of various
characteristics of privatization deals on the property rights index
in the privatizing country.
First, we observe the presence of matching of the property
rights in the countries of the privatization target and the buyer.
Property rights in the buyer’s country, regardless of the organiza-
tional form of the buyer, appear to be strongly correlated with
property rights in the privatizing country. To check whether the
observed relationship is driven by domestic privatization deals,
we restrict the sample to cross-border privatizations only: the
coefﬁcient remains signiﬁcant, albeit lower in magnitude. Unlike
our previous tests, this subset of analyses does not claim a causal
effect, and theoretically, two-sided matching is the most plausible
explanation for the correlation because either party can walk away
from the deal negotiation, rationally pricing in the costs of a poten-
tial mismatch in property rights. On the one side, privatizing gov-titutional development and performance. J. Bank Finance (2013), http://
Table 8
Property rights and characteristics of privatization deals.
Acquirer property rights Crossborder Acquirer is privately held Acquirer includes labor Diversifying Percent acq Percent own
All Crossborder only
Model (1)
Property rights 0.604*** 0.161*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.813*** 0.821***
(.02) (.02) (.0007) (.0007) (.0004) (.0006) (.05) (.05)
Obs. 6588 2434 6588 6588 6588 6588 3863 3887
R2 0.46 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.14 0.14
Model (2)
Property rights quality 0.685*** 0.262*** 0.044*** 0.049*** 0.0005 0.041*** 10.273*** 10.182***
(.01) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.004) (.01) (.60) (.59)
Obs. 6964 2697 6964 6964 6964 6964 4059 4083
R2 0.52 0.16 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.15 0.15
Model (3)
Control of corruption 0.691*** 0.247*** 0.044*** 0.037*** 0.004 0.034*** 8.686*** 8.602***
(.01) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.003) (.005) (.42) (.41)
Obs. 6954 2693 6954 6954 6954 6954 4055 4079
R2 0.51 0.14 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.17 0.17
Model (4)
Rule of law 0.689*** 0.284*** 0.045*** 0.046*** 0.001 0.030*** 8.882*** 8.782***
(.01) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.003) (.01) (.55) (.53)
Obs. 6959 2695 6959 6959 6959 6959 4056 4080
R2 0.52 0.18 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.15 0.14
Model (5)
Political stability 0.731*** 0.260*** 0.004 0.055*** 0.005 0.043*** 6.201*** 6.355***
(.01) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.004) (.01) (.67) (.65)
Obs. 6962 2695 6962 6962 6962 6962 4057 4081
R2 0.60 0.16 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.11 0.11
Model (6)
Property rights 0.578*** 0.151*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.078 0.139
(.02) (.03) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.10) (.09)
Obs. 6439 2377 6439 6439 6439 6439 3786 3810
R2 0.47 0.11 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.17 0.17
Choice of attributes of privatization transactions in the SDC sample of privatization deals. Sample and variable deﬁnitions are presented in Appendix A. Ordinary least squares
regressions and linear probability models are estimated where dependent variables are continuous variables and indicator variables, respectively. Two-digit industry effects
based on the industry of the target being privatized are included. Dependent variables are listed in the column headers. Model (1) regresses the dependent variable on
Property rights (of the target being privatized), Model (2) – on Property rights quality, Model (3) – on Control of corruption, Model (4) – on Rule of law, Model (5) – on Political
stability, and Model (6) – on Property rights and GDP per capita (both of the target being privatized). Robust standard errors are in the parentheses.
 Statistical signiﬁcance at 10% level.
 Statistical signiﬁcance at 5% level.
*** Statistical signiﬁcance at 1% level.
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buyers are protected from expropriation because such buyers have
the right incentives to improve the efﬁciency of former SOEs under
private ownership and offer a price for the privatization target that
is reﬂective of the expected value gains. In turn, privatizing govern-
ments in weak property rights countries are less likely to value efﬁ-
ciency improvements and strong acquirer property rights and will
focus on preserving the potential for government expropriation
and rent extraction after the change in ownership. On the other
side, from the buyer’s standpoint, familiarity with a particular
property rights environment offers a comparative advantage. Buy-
ers from strong property rights countries are more averse to par-
taking in privatizations involving weak property rights targets
because such buyers are less adept at managing government
expropriation and corruption risks.
Better property rights in the privatizing country are also associ-
ated with greater odds of a domestic buyer, which is intuitive, con-
sidering the evidence of matching of property rights environments.
Additionally, strong property rights are associated with lower odds
of a diversifying acquisition (to the extent that diversifying deals
are more likely to erode value, the ﬁnding supports the intuition
that strong property rights increase the probability of value crea-
tion conditional on a privatization occurring). Further, strong prop-
erty rights are associated with lower odds of an employee buyoutPlease cite this article in press as: Knyazeva, A., et al. Ownership change, ins
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankﬁn.2013.02.017(employee involvement on the buy side may result in more stake-
holder rather than investor value focus, potentially delaying some
efﬁciency improvements associated with privatization), larger
stakes, and higher odds of a publicly listed buyer. One interpreta-
tion is that when property rights protections are strong, publicly
listed acquirers are able to avoid government expropriation and
maintain a long-term focus on mitigating intra-ﬁrm incentive
problems.5. Discussion and conclusions
In this paper we have examined the implications of property
and contracting rights for post-privatization performance in the
context of the tradeoffs of privatization reforms.
We presented evidence that the quality of property rights pro-
tection against government expropriation and rent seeking served
as a signiﬁcant determinant of post-privatization performance. We
also found positive effects of strong contracting rights and an effec-
tive judicial system on post-privatization performance. Good over-
all quality of political institutions had weak effects on post-
privatization performance.
Our empirical analysis pointed out the importance of account-
ing for the non-random nature of privatizations, in particular, thetitutional development and performance. J. Bank Finance (2013), http://
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group, which has the effect of confounding privatization effects
on performance and biasing estimates upward. Controlling for this
bias lends a new dimension to the conventional wisdom about per-
formance outcomes of privatization. Privatizations of state-owned
enterprises are followed by a transition period, during which
incentive conﬂicts and restructuring costs (including those associ-
ated with subsidy reductions) temporarily counter efﬁciency
improvements under private ownership. Empirically, this trans-
lates into short-term relative underperformance of privatizations.
Such short-term tradeoffs are most relevant in cases of signiﬁcant
reliance on government subsidies prior to the reform. The tradeoffs
disappear in the long run (after 10 years following reform comple-
tion). This does not imply that private ownership is inefﬁcient, but
rather that the long-term beneﬁts of private ownership are not
realized immediately and that the privatization process involves
a costly adjustment for the target ﬁrm. Moreover, property rights
are a signiﬁcant determinant of post-privatization performance.
Further, the property rights regime in the privatizing country has
implications for the nature and attributes of privatization deals.
The general pattern of the ﬁndings, particularly, the role of
property rights for post-privatization performance, is also con-
ﬁrmed by the industry study of efﬁciency changes in the telecom
sector, prominent for its large scale, ﬁscally motivated privatiza-
tion reforms.
The evidence presented above sheds light on the effects of prop-
erty rights and privatization-related ownership changes for perfor-
mance. Below we discuss several policy implications. Based on our
analysis, it becomes apparent that ‘‘one size does not ﬁt all’’ in the
design of ownership reforms. Strong property rights and contract-
ing rights are instrumental to the success of public-to-private own-
ership transitions. Further, while privatized enterprises generally
perform well in absolute terms, it is in part due to selection. While
incentive beneﬁts are realized in the long run, they are not imme-
diate, and direct and indirect costs of privatization may hinder rel-
ative performance in the short run, especially when dependence on
government subsidies was considerable in the past or expropria-
tion risks are high.
The fact that our ‘‘property rights’’ measure is correlated with
improved performance of public sector enterprises means that it
is capturing more than just the risk of expropriation, and is a
broader indicator of ‘‘institutional quality.’’ Indeed, a basic insight
is that institutional quality matters more than ownership.
Our paper sheds light on a long standing debate in the reform
literature: should privatization precede or follow the creation of
good institutional structures. The advocates of rapid transition sug-
gested that privatization would directly lead to increased perfor-
mance and eventually lead to the other necessary legal and
institutional reforms. Advocates of gradualism countered that
without good institutional structure, privatization would not lead
to improved performance.12 The experience of Russia, as well as
the broader study of Godoy and Stiglitz (2007), supports the gradu-
alist hypothesis: GDP declined with privatization, faster privatiza-
tion did not lead to improved performance, and in many of the
countries, good institutions have yet to be created. This study pro-
vides further micro-economic support: institutional design is critical
for the success of privatization, and even with reasonably good insti-
tutional design, it takes a very long time – beyond the period of this
study (which extends up to 15 years after privatization) – for privati-12 Hoff and Stiglitz (2004a, b, 2008) and Stiglitz (2000a) provide a theoretical
analysis of the difﬁculties not only associated with privatization, especially in the
presence of weak legal protections and poor corporate governance, but also with the
change in the legal regime.
Please cite this article in press as: Knyazeva, A., et al. Ownership change, ins
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankﬁn.2013.02.017zation gains to be evident for those ﬁrms that were previously the
recipients of signiﬁcant subsidies.
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School of Business Administration.Appendix A. Sample and variable deﬁnitions and summary
statistics
Main sample: The main sample for the study of privatization
and property rights on sector performance across all industries
covers European countries and is drawn from the Privatization
Barometer (PB) for 1990–2009. Due to lacking ﬁrm level identiﬁers
and ensuing ﬁrm level matching challenges, PB data is aggregated
to the two-digit SIC industry level by privatization year. It is com-
bined with Compustat Global (CG) data that is similarly aggregated
to the two-digit SIC level for the countries for which both dat-
abases have coverage (Western and Eastern Europe economies)
to construct the ‘all (privatized and public) sectors’ sample. The
‘privatized’ sample includes industries in Europe that have one or
more privatization deals recorded in PB in a given year. Foreign
currency amounts are converted into USD using Compustat Global
currency exchange rate data. We require information on perfor-
mance and the main controls. Additional sample selection criteria
are imposed where indicated. Regressions accounting for endoge-
neity of privatization also require information on sector/country
privatization determinant variables. Property rights data availabil-
ity affects sample size. Where indicated, we use information on
privatizations reported in SDC Platinum, as a robustness test and
to examine the effects of property rights in the acquirer (buyer)
country on performance of the privatized sector. We focus on cases
of target ﬁrms identiﬁed as having ‘‘government’’ ownership status
and acquirers that are non-government. Data is similarly aggre-
gated to two-digit SIC industry level using the industry of the tar-
get, for each year. Macroeconomic data is obtained from World
Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI).
ce:italic>Telecom sector study: The telecom sector privatiza-
tion sample includes privatizations conducted between 1990
and 2000 and the list of countries whose telecom sectors have
remained public, based on Wallsten (2002). Telecom sector data
is obtained from the International Telecommunications Union
(ITU) and WDI.
Deal study: The sample of acquisition transactions obtained from
SDC data. Privatizations are identiﬁed as transactions involving
government-owned targets and non-government-owned buyers.
Property rights data for the target being privatized and the acquirer
mustbe available.ModelsusingProperty rights (basedon ICRGdata)
use the 1985–2010 sample. Models using Property rights
quality (based on World Governance Indicators (WGI) and Kauf-
mann,Kraay, andMastruzzi (KKM)data) use the1990–2010 sample.titutional development and performance. J. Bank Finance (2013), http://
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dPanel A: Variable deﬁnitions
Sector-level study
(main sample)lease cite this article in pres
x.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankﬁn.2Privatization Equal to 1 if one or more privatization
deals are recorded in the sector.
Source: PB or SDC, as speciﬁedProﬁtability One-year lead of the percent of
operating income before depreciation
in total assets. Source: CGProtection of private property rights from expropriation
Property rights Investment Country Risk Guide
(ICRG) country rating; ranges from 0
(weak rights) to 100 (strong rights).
Source: WDI. Values after 2003 ﬁlled
in with 2003 values due to data
constraintsControl of corruption Score ranging between 2.5 (weak
rights) and 2.5 (strong rights) that
reﬂects the level of control over
corruption in the country. Source:
WGI, KKMRule of law Score ranging between 2.5 (weak
rights) and 2.5 (strong rights) that
reﬂects the quality of the rule of law
in the country. Source: WGI, KKMRule of law and
corruption controlAverage of Rule of law and Control of
corruption (see above)Contractual rights and legal system
Legal formalism The index of formality in legal
procedures for collecting on a
bounced check. Lower values indicate
greater ease of contract enforcement
and a lesser degree of legal
formalism. Source: Djankov et al.
(2003)Difﬁculty of enforcing
contracts
(procedures)The average number of procedures
required to enforce a contract. Lower
values indicate greater ease of
contract enforcement. Source: World
Bank Doing Business Indicators (DBI)Difﬁculty of enforcing
contracts (days)The average number of days required
to enforce a contract. Lower values
indicate greater ease of contract
enforcement. Source: DBIEffectiveness of the
judicial systemHigher values indicate a more
effective judicial system. Source: La
Porta et al. (1998)Courts Average of the score on the
dimensions of Judicial Independence
and Impartial Courts. Higher values
indicate a more independent court
system. Source: Economic Freedom of
the World (EFW)Legal system Average of the score on the
dimensions of Judicial Independence,
Impartial Courts, and Integrity of the
Legal System. Higher values indicate
a better legal system. Source: EFWLegal system and
contract enforcementAverage of the score on the
dimensions of Judicial Independence,
Impartial Courts, Integrity of the
Legal System, and Legal Enforcements as: Knyazeva, A., et al. Ownership change, instit
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Panel A: Variable deﬁnitions
Sector-level study
(main sample)utional development and peof Contracts. Higher values indicate a





An index ranging from 1 to 7 that
captures the extent of subordination
of the executive. Higher values
indicate greater limits on executive
power. Source: Polity IVLimited government Score on the dimension of Size of
Government: Expenditures, Taxes,
and Enterprises. Higher values
indicate a smaller, more limited
government. Source: EFWGovernment
effectivenessScore ranging between 2.5 (weak
rights) and 2.5 (strong rights) that
reﬂects the effectiveness of the
government. Source: WGI, KKMRegulatory quality Score ranging between 2.5 (weak
rights) and 2.5 (strong rights) that
reﬂects the regulatory quality in the
country. Source: WGI, KKMRegulations Score on the dimension of Regulation
of Credit, Labor, and Business. Higher
values indicate a better regulatory
environment. Source: EFWPolitical stability Score ranging between 2.5 (weak
rights) and 2.5 (strong rights) that
reﬂects the extent of political stability
in the country. Source: WGI, KKMVoice and
accountabilityScore ranging between 2.5 (weak
rights) and 2.5 (strong rights) that
reﬂects the extent of democratic
voice and accountability in the
country. Source: WGI, KKMAggregate measure
Property rights quality Score ranging between 2.5 (weak
rights) and 2.5 (strong rights) that is
constructed as the average of control
of corruption, rule of law, political
stability, government effectiveness,
regulatory quality, and voice and
accountability scores. Source: WGI,
KKMControls
Size Average log of net sales in USD in the
sector. Source: CG
Growth opportunities Average annual growth in net sales in
the sector. Source: CG
Industry concentration Herﬁndahl index based on net sales in
USD. Source: CG
Economic growth Annual growth in GDP per capita in
constant 2000 USD. Source: WDI
Income per capita Log of GDP per capita in constant
2000 USD. Source: WDI
Past labor/assets One-year lag of the sector averagerformance. J. Bank Finance (2013), http://
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Panel A: Variable deﬁnitions
Sector-level study
(main sample)lease cite this article in pres
x.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankﬁn.2employees per thousand of dollars in
net sales. Source: CGPast sector size (logged) One-year lag of the log of total assets
of ﬁrms in the sector in USD. Source:
CGPast population
(logged)One-year lag of the log of total
population in the country. Source:
WDIPast government
spendingOne-year lag of percent of
government expenditure in GDP.
Source: WDIInitial income per capita Log of GDP per capita in USD for
1989. Source: WDIPast proﬁtability One year lag of proﬁtability (see
above)Initial state sector
employmentAverage of the ratio of public sector
employment in general government
to total employment. Source: La Porta
et al. (2002)French legal origin Equal to 1 if the country has French
legal origin; 0 otherwise. Source: La
Porta et al. (1999)Privatization value Ratio of the total value of
privatization deals to total assets of
ﬁrms in the sector. Source: PB or SDC,
as speciﬁed, and CGPrivatization stake Average percentage stake being
privatized in the sector. Source: PBPrivatization deals Log of one plus the number of
privatization deals in the sector.
Source: PB or SDC, as speciﬁedDeals that are public
offersProportion of privatizations
conducted as public offerings Source:
PBAcquirer property rights
qualityAverage Property rights quality in the
countries of Acquirers involved in
privatization deals. Source: SDC
Acquirer control of corruption,
Acquirer rule of law, and Acquirer
political stability are deﬁned
similarlyTelecom study
Change in main lines
per employee
Change in levels and growth rates of
main lines (main telephone lines in
operation, in thousands) per total full
time telecommunications staff
Source: ITU, WDIFrench (English) legal
originEqual to 1 if the country has French
(English) legal origin; 0 otherwise.
Source: La Porta et al. (1999)Property rights Investment Country Risk Guide
country rating; ranges from 0 (low
risk) to 100 (high risk). Source: WDIRegulator Dummy equal to 1 if an autonomous
regulator is present; 0 otherwise.
Source: Guillen et al. (2004), Wallsten
(2002)s as: Knyazeva, A., et al. Ownership change, instit
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Panel A: Variable deﬁnitions
Sector-level study
(main sample)utional development and peRegulator before
privatizationDummy equal to 1 if an autonomous
regulator is established before
privatization; 0 otherwise. Source:
Guillen et al. (2004), Wallsten (2002)Domestic bank credit Percentage of domestic bank credit to
GDP. Source: WDIInitial budget balance/
GDPAverage percentage of budget balance
in GDP in 1982–1984. Source: WDINet FDI Net foreign direct investment to GDP.
Source: WDIFull privatization Dummy equal to 1 if the country
implemented a full privatization
reform; 0 otherwise. Source: Guillen
et al. (2004)Early privatization Dummy variable equal to 1 if the
privatization was implemented in
1995 or earlier; 0 otherwiseLocal competition Average of the competition index, for
local telephony. Source: Li and Xu
(2002)Long distance
competitionAverage of the competition index, for
long distance telephony. Source: Li
and Xu (2002)Initial main line
penetrationAverage of main lines per 100
inhabitants for years [1982, 1983,
1984] (for 1975, 1976, 1977 for
Chile). Source: ITU/WDIInitial GNP per capita Log of GNP per capita for 1970–1995
in USD (log). Source: La Porta et al.
(1999)Initial GDP per capita Average GDP per capita (log) in 1982–
1984. Source: WDIInitial CPI inﬂation Average percentage change in
consumer prices in 1982–1984.
Source: WDIInitial population size Average population (log) in 1982–
1984. Source: WDISub-Saharan Africa Binary variable for Sub-Saharan
Africa country classiﬁcation. Source:
WBEthno-linguistic
fractionalizationEthno-linguistic fractionalization,
from 0 to 100. Source: La Porta et al.
(1999)Primary enrollment Enrollment in primary schools, total,
% of labor force in 1990. Source: WDILife expectancy Average life expectancy at birth, total,
in 1990. Source: WDIPrivatization deal attributes study
Cross-border Equal to 1 if the acquirer is in a
different country than the target
being privatized. Source: SDCAcquirer is privately
heldEqual to 1 if the acquirer is privately
held (not listed publicly on an
exchange)Acquirer includes labor Equal to 1 if the acquirer includes
employees, management, or
employee stock ownership plan.(continued on next page)rformance. J. Bank Finance (2013), http://
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Panel A: Variable deﬁnitions
Sector-level study
(main sample)lease cite this article in pres
x.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankﬁn.2Source: SDC
Diversifying Equal to 1 if the acquirer and target
are from different SIC4 industries.
Source: SDCPercent acq Percentage stake the buyer is seeking
to acquire in the privatization
transaction. Source: SDCPercent own Percentage stake the buyer is seeking
to own after the privatization
transaction. Source: SDCPanel B: Summary statistics of the main variabless as
013Obs.: Knyazev
.02.017Meana, A., et aMedianl. OwnershStd.
Dev.Main sample
Privatized sectors
Proﬁtability 632 10.32 10.10 7.25
Protection of private property rights from expropriation
Property rights 632 81.51 81.80 3.61
Control of corruption 627 1.59 1.73 0.62
Rule of law 627 1.44 1.58 0.37
Rule of law and corruption
control
627 1.51 1.69 0.48Contractual rights and legal system
Legal formalism 628 3.50 3.51 0.71
Difﬁculty of enforcing
contracts (procedures)
632 32.78 30.00 4.88Difﬁculty of enforcing
contracts (days)632 491 404 187Effectiveness of the judicial
system612 8.40 9.00 1.52Courts 550 7.41 7.75 1.64
Legal system 550 7.91 8.28 1.42
Legal system and contract
enforcement
550 7.77 7.82 1.43Political environment
Constraint on the
executive
632 6.86 7.00 0.34Limited government 627 1.24 1.28 0.21
Government effectiveness 632 4.49 4.60 1.13
Regulatory quality 627 1.60 1.76 0.45
Regulations 627 1.20 1.15 0.32
Political stability 632 6.59 6.40 0.91
Voice and accountability 627 0.90 0.88 0.30
Controls
Size 632 6.99 7.18 1.32
Growth opportunities 632 0.17 0.11 0.42
Economic growth 632 2.04 2.08 1.89
GDP per capita 632 9.84 9.92 0.36
Industry concentration 785 0.55 0.50 0.31
Privatization deals 695 1.75 1.61 0.73
Privatization value 695 1.45 0.07 7.43
Privatization stake 695 57.84 52.17 35.92
Deals that are public offers 695 0.34 0.00 0.46ip change, institSample and variable deﬁnitions and summary statistics
(continued)
Panel B: Summary statistics of the main variablesutional development and perforObs.mance. J.MeanBank FinMedianance (2013Std.
Dev.All sectors (main sample)
Proﬁtability 10,746 9.46 9.86 8.62
Privatization 10,746 0.07 0.00 0.26
Property rights quality 10,718 1.33 1.42 0.36
Control of corruption 10,718 1.54 1.55 0.65
Rule of law 10,718 1.41 1.57 0.41
Political stability 10,718 0.91 0.91 0.32
Property rights 10,746 81.78 82.00 3.90
Size 10,746 6.07 6.16 1.74
Growth opportunities 10,746 0.13 0.08 0.44
GDP per capita 10,746 9.81 9.96 0.49
Industry concentration 10,746 0.64 0.60 0.31Privatized sectors (SDC sample)
Acquirer property rights
quality
704 0.88 1.22 0.78Acquirer control of
corruption704 1.07 1.35 1.00Acquirer rule of law 704 0.97 1.33 0.83
Acquirer political stability 704 0.52 0.83 0.73
Telecom sample
Change in growth of main
lines per employee
74 2.49 1.46 13.89French legal origin 105 0.48 0.00 0.50
English legal origin 105 0.26 0.00 0.44
Property rights 76 58.71 54.42 16.14
Regulator 105 0.82 1.00 0.39
Regulator (prior) 105 0.36 0.00 0.48
Budget balance 78 3.14 2.61 4.69
Domestic bank credit 84 56.54 45.91 44.62
Net FDI 84 1.12 0.49 2.07
Competition (local) 89 0.85 0.00 1.18
Competition (long
distance)
92 0.74 0.00 1.18Life expectancy 103 64.05 67.60 10.49
Primary enrollment 99 92.01 98.37 22.51
Ethno-linguistic
fractionalization
90 0.37 0.33 0.30Sub-Saharan Africa 105 0.29 0.00 0.45
Main lines per 100
inhabitants
103 12.56 4.80 16.55GNP per capita 103 7.27 7.15 1.39
Population size 101 0.28 0.70 1.00
Early privatization 66 0.47 0.00 0.50
Full privatization 105 0.11 0.00 0.31Privatization deals sample
Property rights quality 6964 0.54 0.78 0.85
Control of corruption 6955 0.58 0.53 1.13
Rule of law 6960 0.59 0.85 0.94
Political stability 6963 0.34 0.68 0.83
Property rights 6588 74.21 75.30 9.62
Acquirer property rights
quality
6964 0.81 1.16 0.82Acquirer control of
corruption6957 0.95 1.34 1.11Acquirer rule of law 6960 0.89 1.30 0.91
Acquirer political stability 6963 0.49 0.83 0.79
Acquirer property rights 6588 77.09 79.50 8.74), http://
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Panel B: Summary statistics of the main variableslease cite this article in press as
x.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankﬁn.2013Obs.: Knyazev
.02.017Meana, A., et aMedianl. OwnershStd.
Dev.Cross-border 6964 0.39 0.00 0.49
Acquirer is privately held 6964 0.57 1.00 0.50
Acquirer includes labor 6964 0.08 0.00 0.27
Diversifying 6964 0.73 1.00 0.45
Percent acq 4059 72.02 84.65 31.66
Percent own 4083 73.31 85.00 30.66Appendix B. Privatization determinants (main sample)
Probit of privatization likelihood in the European sample of all industries. Column I reports the main model. Column II–IV add controls
for robustness. Exclusion of Initial income and French legal origin determinants from the ﬁrst stage does not materially affect model results.
Robust standard errors are in the parentheses.Iip change, institutIIional development and perfIIIormance. J. Bank Finance (2IVInitial income per capita 0.558⁄⁄⁄ 0.564⁄⁄⁄ 0.480⁄⁄ 1.688⁄⁄⁄
(0.11) (0.12) (0.19) (0.28)French legal origin 0.097⁄ 0.114⁄⁄ 0.041 0.533⁄⁄⁄
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10)Past population (logged) 0.242⁄⁄⁄ 0.244⁄⁄⁄ 0.124⁄⁄⁄ 0.293⁄⁄⁄(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Past labor/assets (1.E04) 0.004 0.001 0.0064.E03 4.E03 5.E03 5.E03
Past sector size (logged) 0.030⁄⁄ 0.037⁄⁄⁄ 0.027 0.056⁄⁄⁄(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Past government spending 0.028⁄⁄ 0.031⁄⁄⁄ 0.010 0.094⁄⁄⁄(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Past proﬁtability 1.456⁄⁄⁄(0.36)
Initial proﬁtability 0.007(4.E03)
Initial state sector employment 3.239⁄⁄(1.52)Obs. 8795 8795 3599 7378
Pseudo-R2 0.207 0.211 0.071 0.215Appendix C. Robustness tests for the main sample
Sample and variable deﬁnitions are presented in Appendix A. The dependent variable is proﬁtability (1-year lead). Privatization indica-
tor equals one if one or more deals was reported in the sector in a given period. Two-digit industry effects are included. Robust standard
errors are in the parentheses. Statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted with , , and , respectively.
Panel A: Property rights effects on the performance of privatized industries in the sample of privatizations. The main sample of European
privatizations is used in Columns I–III. Column I excludes observations with missing data on privatization determinants in Table C1 for
comparability with privatization observations used in the selection model. Column II excludes privatizations in the ﬁnancial sector (SIC
6000–6999). Column III enhances the speciﬁcation with additional controls. The SDC sample of privatizations in all countries is used in
Column IV.
Panel B: Regressions of privatization and property rights effects on performance in the sample of all (privatized and public) sectors. Col-
umns I–IV use ordinary least squares. Column V uses treatment effects estimation using ﬁrst-stage determinants in Table C1 to predict
privatization. The main sample of European privatizations is used in Columns I–III. Column I excludes observations with missing data
on privatization determinants. Column II excludes privatizations in the ﬁnancial sector (SIC 6000–6999). Columns IV–V use the SDC sample
of privatizations in all countries (observations with missing data on privatization determinants are excluded).013), http://
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x.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankﬁn.2013.02.017It al. Ownership change, institIIutional development and peIIIrformance. J. Bank Finance (2IVPanel A. Property rights effects on the performance of privatized sectors
Property rights quality 4.539⁄⁄⁄ 4.053⁄⁄⁄ 2.685⁄⁄⁄ 2.414⁄⁄⁄(.95) (.91) (.95) (.82)
Size 1.211⁄⁄⁄ 1.089⁄⁄⁄ 1.368⁄⁄⁄ 1.688⁄⁄⁄(.35) (.27) (.32) (.28)




Deals that are public offers 1.187(.73)
Industry concentration 2.476⁄⁄(1.25)
Income per capita 10.843⁄⁄⁄ 5.191⁄⁄⁄ 5.051⁄⁄⁄ 3.259⁄⁄⁄(1.34) (.80) (.83) (.61)Obs. 607 767 692 713
R2 0.26 0.21 0.24 0.27I II III IV VPanel B. Property rights and privatization effects on performance (all sectors)
Privatization 0.509 0.056 1.262 0.004 13.638⁄⁄⁄(.32) (.28) (1.11) (.41) (.58)
Property rights quality 4.078⁄⁄⁄ 3.800⁄⁄⁄ 3.099⁄⁄⁄ 2.097⁄⁄⁄ 1.912⁄⁄⁄(.32) (.28) (.30) (.20) (.20)
Size 1.064⁄⁄⁄ 1.169⁄⁄⁄ 1.008⁄⁄⁄ 1.473⁄⁄⁄ 1.553⁄⁄⁄(.10) (.09) (.08) (.06) (.07)




Deals that are public offers 1.163⁄(.70)
Industry concentration 1.764⁄⁄⁄(.30)
Income per capita 7.734⁄⁄⁄ 5.099⁄⁄⁄ 4.808⁄⁄⁄ 2.943⁄⁄⁄ 2.826⁄⁄⁄(.42) (.25) (.28) (.13) (.13)Obs. 8625 10,527 9275 16,666 16,666
R2 0.19 0.16 0.18 0.16Appendix D. Additional evidence and robustness checks for the telecom study
Sample and variable deﬁnitions are presented in Appendix A. The dependent variable is the change in the average growth of main lines
per employee from 1987–1989 to 2000–2002, unless noted otherwise.
Panel A uses probit estimation to examine the decision to privatize. The dependent variable is a dummy for transfer of ownership stake
from government to private holders.
Panel B performs t-tests of differences in means are performed on the privatized sector subsample and on the full sample of privatized
and public sectors.
Panel C provides additional multivariate tests of property rights effects on performance gains in privatized sectors using a selection
model.013), http://
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French legal origin 0.280 0.253 0.480 0.591(.43) (.43) (.39) (.38)
Property rights 0.034 0.044⁄ 0.065⁄⁄⁄ 0.062⁄⁄(.02) (.02) (.02) (.03)
CPI index 0.016⁄ 0.016⁄ 0.013 0.015⁄(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Primary enrollment 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.004(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Population (logged) 0.211 0.086 0.244 0.353(.28) (.24) (.22) (.26)
Initial GDP per capita (logged) 0.355⁄⁄ 0.347⁄⁄(.15) (.15)
Initial GNP per capita (logged) 0.805⁄⁄⁄ 1.075⁄⁄⁄(.28) (.32)
Main lines (prior) 0.002 0.003(.00) (.00)Obs. 65 65 67 67Privatized sectors Average performance in sectors that underwent privatization
Performance measure Obs. Mean 1987–1989 (before) Mean 2000–2002 (after) Diff.Panel B. Univariate evidence
Main lines per employee
– Levels 50 74.659 168.385 93.727⁄⁄⁄– Growth rate 47 5.768 7.385 1.617Privatized and public sectors Performance changes between 1987–1989 and 2000–2002
Performance measure Obs. Privatized sectors Remained public Diff.
Main lines per employee
– Levels 83 93.727 53.352 41.374⁄⁄– Growth rate 74 1.617 3.495 1.878
I II III IVPanel C. Property rights and performance gains in privatized sectors
Property rights 0.496⁄⁄ 0.552⁄⁄⁄ 0.666⁄⁄ 0.585⁄⁄(.24) (.20) (.15) (.23)
Regulator (prior) 6.320⁄ 1.631 5.754⁄⁄ 1.676(3.44) (3.17) (2.93) (3.18)
Sub-Saharan Africa 5.649 10.067⁄⁄ 7.420⁄⁄⁄ 10.592⁄(5.56) (4.99) (2.70) (6.07)
GDP per capita (logged) 1.415 0.958 1.218 0.839(1.66) (1.19) (1.17) (1.26)
Main lines (prior) 0.058⁄⁄⁄ 0.071⁄⁄⁄ 0.070⁄⁄⁄ 0.072⁄⁄⁄(.02) (.02) (.01) (.02)
Full privatization 4.317 4.375 4.700 4.574(5.73) (5.63) (5.02) (5.90)
Budget balance 0.145 0.101(.44) (.40)
Net FDI 1.292⁄⁄ 1.219⁄(.57) (.72)
Competition (long distance) 2.315 2.811⁄⁄⁄(1.44) (.98)
Competition (local) 2.238⁄ 3.149⁄⁄⁄(1.24) (1.21)Obs. 58 58 57 57013), http://
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Privatization 13.277⁄⁄ 14.489⁄⁄ 14.328⁄⁄⁄(5.75) (6.41) (5.19)
French legal origin 6.383⁄ 6.642⁄ 7.027⁄(3.83) (3.97) (3.85)
Property rights 0.222(.23)
Budget balance 0.808⁄⁄ 0.829⁄⁄ 0.692⁄(.36) (.35) (.38)
Regulatory reform 5.803 5.696 5.784(4.93) (4.70) (4.92)
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